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1. Introduction 
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a highly prevalent and recurrent disorder. Recent 
epidemiological studies have shown that up to 16% of the general population will suffer 
from at least one clinical episode of depression in their lifetime with women being affected 
more frequently than men (for a review, see [1]). The World Health Organization considers 
depressive disorders as one of the leading causes of disease worldwide, accounting for 
about 4.4% of total disability adjusted life years (DALY; [2]). Longitudinal studies indicate 
that up to 85% of depressed patients suffer from multiple episodes [3], and that 15-20% of 
episodes take a chronic course [4]. However, a unitary model providing axiomatic factors 
related to the development and maintenance of depression has not been established so far, 
what is most likely due to substantial heterogeneity in the etiology and symptomatology of 
depressive syndromes [5].  
This chapter aims to provide a selective review of evidence on how alterations in associative 
learning relate to the (etio-) psychopathology of depression in the context of widely 
accepted models of the disorder.  
2. Models of depression 
The literature on the development and maintenance of MDD is characterized by several 
lines of research that have highlighted alterations on different levels (i.e., cognitive-
emotional, behavioral, and psychophysiological) to be relevant for the understanding of 
depression. Cognitive models of depression focus on alterations in human information 
processing by investigating attributional style and other cognitive variables, recently also 
including rumination. Behavioral and neurobiological models of depression dominantly 
refer to animal models of depression such as chronic stress or learned helplessness to 
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investigate behavioral, endocrinological, and molecular characteristics of depression-like 
behaviors. Meanwhile, recent neuroimaging studies in humans aim to isolate specific 
structural and functional alterations in the brain associated with dysfunctions of emotion, 
motivation, and cognition in depression. 
The current diagnosis of depressive disorders according to recent versions of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) [6] and the International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Health Related Problems (ICD-10) [7] exclusively refer to the 
presence of decisive symptoms including depressed mood and anhedonia in a given time 
period. Although these nosological classification systems allow for objective diagnosis of 
and communication about depression, the neuropsychopathological signature of the 
disorder as proposed by depression models is not leading for the diagnosis. As a 
consequence, current depression diagnosis and research on the psychological and 
psychophysiological correlates of depression do not inevitable fall into place.  
2.1. Cognitive models of depression 
Cognitive theories of depression are among the most prominent models of depression. The 
two most influential cognitive theories, Beck’s schema theory and the reformulated 
hopelessness theory by Abramson and colleagues (cf., [8]), point to the role of maladaptive 
self-schemata and negative inferential style for the onset, course, and outcome of 
depression. Prospective studies have shown that negative attributional styles and 
dysfunctional attitudes predict the onset of depressed mood and symptoms [9]. Parallel 
research strategies using experimental paradigms from cognitive psychology found 
depression to be associated with excessive attending to negative stimuli, fast recall of 
negative memories, over-generalized recall of autobiographical experiences, and a tendency 
for negative judgments on hypothetical and real-life experiences (e.g., [10]). 
A third line of research deals with cognitive processes of affect regulation that might predict 
recovery from or worsening of depressed mood. In this context, the response styles theory 
by Nolen-Hoeksema [11] addresses the role of perseverative self-focused rumination versus 
distraction from negative mood for the exacerbation, maintenance, and discontinuation of 
depressed states. Ruminative responses are defined as thoughts and behaviors that 
comprise passively focusing one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms, and repetitively 
thinking about possible causes and consequences of these symptoms. Distractive coping is 
defined as actively turning one’s attention away from one’s symptoms to pleasant or neutral 
thoughts and actions. There is strong evidence from laboratory and observational studies 
with nonclinical samples for the proposed predictions of response styles, particularly 
rumination, on the severity and duration of depressed mood. Self-reported rumination is 
associated with depression severity [12-14] and experimentally induced rumination 
prolongs dysphoric mood, enhances negatively biased memories, and impairs interpersonal 
and complex problem solving, while induced distraction predicts the decline of depressed 
mood [15]. Furthermore, a ruminative response style was found to predict future levels of 
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depressed mood, even after controlling for baseline levels of depression (e.g., [11, 13-14]). 
High trait rumination scores in currently and past depressed subjects point to the role of a 
ruminative style as a potential vulnerability factor for depression [16-17]. 
These findings generally support the hypothesis that depressed individuals suffer from two 
dominant cognitive biases [18]: First, depressed individuals show increased attention for 
negative information; and second, they show extensive self-referential processing 
concerning the (negative) appraisal of stimuli and experiences. 
2.2. Behavioral and neurobiological models of depression 
Animal models of depression have dominantly focused on paradigms such as chronic mild 
stress or learned helplessness to induce depression-like behavior in unselected strains of 
animals or in animals bred for susceptibility to stress. When exposing animals to inescapable 
shocks or chronic mild stress they show subsequent impairments in active escape responses 
and a reduction in responsiveness to rewards as well as distinct neuroendocrinological 
changes [19-21]. These models in addition to lesion studies in animals [22] have generated 
many hypotheses about the neurobiological mechanisms involved in depression [23]. In 
parallel, proposed alterations in candidate regions and neural networks, assumed to play a 
major role in depression, have been found in neuroimaging studies in humans. Besides 
structural alterations mainly in terms of reduced grey-matter volumes in fronto-limbic 
regions [22], functional alterations in frontal regions, including the anterior cingulate cortex, 
and limbic structures, such as the amygdala and hippocampus, have been detected in 
prominent functional imaging studies. Recently, functional alterations in striatal structures 
(nucleus accumbens, caudate, putamen) have been related to altered reward and loss 
processing in depression [24]. Meta-analytic findings [25] emphasize that depression is 
characterized by predominantly reduced activity in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex and 
anterior insula, which is linked to altered salience processing of emotional and cognitive 
stimuli. In addition, hypersensitivity to negative information and reduced executive 
functioning seem substantially associated with a lack of prefrontal control in terms of both 
exaggerated frontal hypo- and hyperactivity. Functional alterations in striatal regions seem 
closely related to biased valence processing in MDD with a hemispheric dissociation 
depicting right-sided hypoactivity to positive and left-sided hyperactivity to negative 
stimuli. Moreover, increased activation in an extended medial prefrontal network during 
self-referential processing was found in depressed individuals [26]. 
Thus, biased information processing in depression as proposed by cognitive models of the 
disorder obviously correlate with partly specific neurofunctional alterations in depressed 
individuals. Several lines of evidence point to medial prefrontal, limbic, and striato-pallido-
thalamic regions to be critically involved in the pathophysiology of MDD [27]. However, it 
needs to be mentioned that rather heterogeneous than homogeneous results for multiple 
cortical and subcortical regions characterize the current state on functional neuroimaging 
findings in major depression [25]. 
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2.3. Integrative diathesis-stress models of depression 
In attempting to understand how alterations on the emotional-cognitive and 
neurophysiological dimension emerge, diathesis-stress models generally postulate that both 
biological and environmental factors affect the development of psychological disorders, 
including depression [28]. The basic assumption is that stress activates a diathesis in turn 
transforming the predisposition or vulnerability for a disorder into the presence of the 
disorder. During the long history of this general model, the concepts for vulnerability and 
stress have notably changed. Importantly, although multiple events might be universally 
termed as stressful (e.g., the death of a significant person), the experience of stress is 
assumed to be dependent on the individual’s appraisal of negative events. Likewise, the 
concept of vulnerability – initially focusing on heritable and biological factors – has been 
enriched by including psychological factors, such as cognitive and interpersonal variables 
[28]. As a consequence, the rigorous distinction between external (stressors) and internal 
(vulnerability) factors has been abandoned in support of an interactive perspective. That is, 
the diathesis is assumed to influence the way in which individuals deal with life events and 
thus with stressors to which they are exposed [29]. Empirical studies found a significant 
association between adverse life events encountered during development [30-31] as well as 
adulthood [32-34] and increased diathesis for depression. Major adverse life events related 
to depression seem to involve experiences of threat, loss, and humiliation [32, 35]. Therefore, 
changes in behavior that occur as a result of such experiences, i.e. learning to cope with 
negative events, may become central for the understanding of depression.  
3. Associative learning and depression 
About a century ago, Thorndike [36] proposed that learning reinforces the formation of 
connections or associations between stimuli and responses, whenever a response is followed 
by a positive outcome (law of effect). In parallel, Pavlov [37] found that repeated pairings of 
a neutral stimulus (e.g., a ringing bell) with an unconditioned stimulus (e.g., food pellets) 
qualify the neutral stimulus to trigger (almost) identical physiological reactions as the 
unconditioned stimulus. That is, the unconditioned reaction (in this case: salivation), which 
was initially only released by the unconditioned stimulus, came elicited by the neutral 
stimulus. In conditioning terminology: The neutral stimulus became a conditioned stimulus 
triggering a conditioned reaction (for reviews, see [38-39]). Consequently, Pavlovian 
condition is traditionally conceptualized as learning through “stimulus substitution”. The 
influential Rescorla-Wagner model of conditioning, however, rejects the classical notion on 
how Pavlovian conditioning is working: “Pavlovian conditioning is not the shifting of a 
response from one stimulus to another. Instead, conditioning involves the learning of 
relations among events that are complexly represented, a learning that can be exhibited in 
various ways” [40]. Thus, modern Pavlovian thinking highlights the information that one 
stimulus gives about another and that organisms adjust their Pavlovian associations for 
their internal representation of the world. This implies that associative learning advances 
only to the extent to which a reinforcer is unpredicted (in terms of producing a prediction 
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error) and slows progressively as the reinforcer becomes more predicted. Therefore, 
learning is assumed to be driven by changes in the expectations about salient events such as 
rewards and punishments [41].  
Dysfunctional associative learning in terms of both instrumental (operant, Thorndikean) and 
respondent (Pavlovian) conditioning has been related to the development and maintenance 
of depression. Most remarkably, altered associative learning seems particularly linked to 
enhanced sensitivity for negative events and impaired responsiveness to positive stimuli in 
depression [42-43]. 
3.1. Altered aversive instrumental conditioning and learned helplessness in 
depression  
Learning from the consequences of one’s own behavior is central to instrumental 
conditioning. Against the background of cognitive theories proposing that depression is 
associated with negative attitudes and assumptions, depressed individuals are suggested to 
show increased sensitivity for negative outcomes and feedback. In addition to depressed 
mood, anhedonia is one of the core symptoms of depression and depict the loss of interest in 
originally rewarding or enjoyable activities. Thus, reduced responsiveness to positive 
outcomes should be evident in depression as well.  
Numerous cognitive tasks have been applied to elucidate the neuropsychological profile of 
depression [10]. Some of these tasks provide direct information about performance accuracy 
and depressed individuals have been found to show biased responding to negative feedback 
in terms of a “catastrophic response to perceived failure” [44]: When depressed individuals 
make a mistake, their subsequent performance deteriorated considerably. In addition, 
depressed individuals showed such impairment when objected to false negative feedback in 
tasks known to be dependent on the integrity of the neural affective loop circuitry [45-46]. It 
has been concluded that failure feedback can exert its influence on cognitive performance by 
altering the attentive focus toward increased negative focussing on the self, and that this 
attentional shift might decrease the cognitive resources available for the task [45]. These 
findings suggest that depressed individuals are in particular vulnerable to negative 
feedback, what might constitute a major etiological factor for the disorder. However, the 
question why depressed individuals show altered responding to errors and negative 
feedback can not be answered by means of neuropsychological tests. To this end, 
experimental paradigms which manipulate psychological variables related to negative 
events are mandatory. This was done in paradigms investigating learned helplessness.  
Incidentally found in animals [47-48], learned helplessness gives an explanation for the 
observation that exposure to inescapable aversive events leads to a subsequent deficit in 
escape or avoidance behavior. Mirroring instrumental learning theory, which proposes that 
subjects learn that their behavior controls reinforcement, learned helplessness proposes that 
subjects learn that their behavior cannot control reinforcement [49]. In contrast to animal 
research, however, few studies have used the original (triadic) experimental design to 
investigate learned helplessness in humans [50]. Moreover, most of these studies did not 
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assess the neural correlates of learned helpless behaviors and they were often conducted in 
healthy individuals or analogue subjects rather than clinically depressed patients. 
3.1.1. From learned helplessness to hopelessness depression 
To evaluate learned helplessness findings in humans, it is important to bear in mind the 
methodological procedure of the original animal paradigm (cf. [51]). In the original protocol, 
animals were first subjected to aversive respondent conditioning, in which a light was 
repeatedly paired with electric footshocks, while the animals were restrained in a Pavlovian 
harness. Subsequently the majority of animals (but not all) failed to learn to escape or avoid 
footshocks in a shuttlebox. Further experimental variations found the light unnecessary for 
this effect, and evidenced the inescapable and unavoidable shocks as the causative agent. 
Groups exposed to unescapable and unavoidable shocks versus escapable and yoked 
inescapable shocks have been compared. To this end, shocks were applied at the same time 
(frequency) and for the same intensity in the animals that could escape and their yoked 
partners. The shocks terminated when the animals which had the possibility to escape made 
an instrumental response (i.e., hitting a panel). Importantly, hitting the panel had no 
consequences in the yoked animal group: Aversive shocks were inescapable, and only 
animals receiving yoked inescapable shocks showed a subsequent learning deficit. Thus, 
uncontrollability over the aversive shocks was proposed as key variable in producing later 
failure to learn and consequently termed as learned helplessness (for a critical discussion on 
the term learned helplessness versus interference, see [52]). 
According to these experimental results, two fundamental components are essential for the 
investigation of learned helplessness: First, it is crucial to show that indeed uncontrollability 
over aversive events is the driving force of learned helplessness. This implies a comparison 
between conditions in which subjects were exposed to uncontrollable, relative to exactly 
equal controllable stressors. Second, in the original procedure, subjects received 
uncontrollable stressors in a different arrangement (Pavlovian harness) than the one which 
was used to test for learned helplessness effects (shuttlebox). Therefore, learned helplessness 
includes trans-situationality as part of the original definition [51]. Moreover, the fully 
established triadic design includes a control group, which is naïve to aversive stimulation. 
That is, both the escape and yoked group have identical aversive stimulation as compared to 
the naïve group, but uncontrollability over aversive electrical stimulation is only present in 
the yoked group. As a well replicated finding, the naïve group shows a comparable level of 
escape behavior as the escape group and thus learned helplessness effects can be attributed 
to the loss of control over aversive events in the yoked group (cf. [53]).  
Possible consequences of stressor uncontrollability range from cognitive, motivational, and 
emotional alterations [54] to neuroendocrinological as well as functional and structural 
brain changes [55] that are in line with core features of depression. However, it is 
noteworthy that learned helplessness was initially not conceptualized to provide an animal 
model of depression or any other psychopathological condition [51]. Nevertheless, there is 
an obvious analogy to emotional, motivational, and cognitive complains of depressed 
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individuals: Increased negative emotions, reduced motivation, and reduced cognitive 
abilities to establish adaptive behavior to cope with stressors. Thus, it is reasonable to 
assume that if individuals learn that their behavior cannot control aversive events, negative 
emotionality becomes persistent and the motivation to actively manipulate stressful 
situations decreases in line with reduced awareness for potentially changed contingencies 
between own behavioral responses and environmental events. In addition, based on the 
trans-situational nature of the learned helplessness paradigm, learned helpless behavior is 
assumed to generalize across contexts with also future events being expected as 
uncontrollable.  
Experimental studies in healthy humans widely validated learned helplessness results from 
animal research. By translating the general experimental procedure into human laboratory 
protocols, several aversive stimuli have been employed, such as electric and heat shocks, 
loud noise, and challenging cognitive tasks. In such a way learned helplessness effects were 
demonstrated for reduced escape behavior to aversive stimuli and reduced performance on 
cognitive tasks in healthy humans (for a review, see [56]). However, studies which focussed 
on the generalization of learned helplessness did not always show unambiguous results 
[57]. Moreover, it remains an open question as to which extent these experimental findings 
can be transferred to real-life settings. In addition to the assumption that repeated exposure 
to uncontrollable aversive events might increase generalization of learned helpless behavior, 
it has been proposed that generalized learned helplessness is dependent on the strength of 
aversive outcomes. That is, generalized learned helplessness is more likely to occur when 
the outcome is highly aversive, or when a highly desired outcome is not reachable by the 
individual [56]. Uncontrollable adverse life events, such as loss and humiliation might have 
the potential to induce long-lasting learned helplessness effects. At least such life events 
have been found to predict depressive episodes [58]. However, independent of whether 
negative events are objectively controllable or not, the manner of how individuals attribute 
the causes of negative events seems essential. This cognitive aspect was addressed in the 
revised learned helplessness theory [56]. Based on social attribution theory [59], revised 
learned helplessness theory proposes that individuals attribute causes on several 
dimensions: internal/external, stable/unstable, and global/specific. Hence, highly internal, 
stable, and global attributions for negative outcomes would relate to low self-esteem and 
helplessness depression. Moreover, a subsequent reformulation – the hopelessness theory of 
depression – suggests that latent attributional diatheses combined with stressors produce a 
specific subtype of depression, i.e. hopelessness depression [8, 60]. This subtype of 
depression is characterized by dispositional negative expectations that desired outcomes 
will never occur and that one’s own behavior is not effective for realizing desired outcomes 
(hopelessness).  
Taken together, original learned helplessness theory proposed uncontrollability over 
aversive events, which in conditioning terminology depicts noncontingency between 
behavioral responses and reinforcement, as key variable for subsequent deficits in 
instrumental learning. The learned helplessness effect involves emotional, motivational, and 
cognitive characteristics obviously mirroring constituent parts of depressive 
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symptomatology. Refined learned helplessness theory subsequently focussed on negative 
self-referential attributional style as a prerequisite for depressogenic behavior. Finally, the 
hopelessness theory of depression proposed a subtype of depression to be fundamentally 
related to habitual negative expectations about the self and outcomes (hopelessness). Thus, 
bringing the original assumptions of learned helplessness to clinical depression provoked a 
change in meaning for the causal importance of uncontrollability. In contrast to the original 
finding that uncontrollability over aversive events results in depression-like emotional, 
motivational, and cognitive alterations, the hopelessness theory of depression treats learned 
helplessness (caused by uncontrollability) not as a cause but as a necessary, however, not 
sufficient component of generalized hopelessness. Beside other critical issues, this 
conceptual development was mainly driven by the question whether or not learned 
helplessness does generalize across contexts in humans. Both revised learned helplessness 
and hopelessness theory suggest additional cognitive variables (causal attribution, negative 
inferential style) to be necessary for generalization.  
Taking account of cognitive variables for the understanding of depression is beyond 
dispute. However, proposed effects of these variables have been obtained mainly by means 
of psychometric questionnaires which measure, e.g., inferential and response style [61] and 
hopelessness [62]. In addition to this approach and in the context of learned helplessness 
theory, it is desirable to have more direct data on cognitive mechanisms and related brain 
functioning when individuals are confronted with aversive events. Surprisingly few studies 
have addressed this topic. 
3.1.2. Neural correlates of uncontrollability over aversive events in humans  
Alterations in neural activation related to uncontrollability over aversive stimulation have 
been investigated by means of electroencephalography (EEG), functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), and positron emission tomography (PET).  
Seminal EEG studies [63-64] used a change from an escape to an uncontrollability paradigm 
in healthy individuals to assess variations in slow cortical potentials (SCP) and especially 
the post-imperative negative variation (PINV) related to controllability versus 
uncontrollability over aversive stimuli. In an S1-S2 reaction paradigm, participants received 
two different warning stimuli that signaled either a neutral tone or an aversive noise. 
Participants could avoid the aversive noise by a motor response in the first half of the 
experiment. Control was withdrawn in the second half of the experiment without prior 
warning and subjects unexpectedly could no longer avoid aversive stimulation. The main 
finding was an increase of the PINV over frontal recording sites during the uncontrollability 
condition independent of the amount of aversive stimulation per se. Subsequent studies 
confirmed increased PINV magnitudes to be sensitively related to unpredictable changes in 
response outcome contingencies [65] in support of the notion that the PINV reflects 
contingency reappraisal of formerly learned response outcome associations [64]. However, 
one major methodological aspect distinguishes paradigms for the investigation of the PINV 
as an electrophysiological index of altered information processing related to loss of control 
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from paradigms used to investigate learned helplessness: Original PINV paradigms started 
with a condition in which subjects were able to control aversive stimulation followed by a 
condition of loss of control. This is exactly in reversed order as compared to learned 
helplessness studies. Against this background, a recent EEG study [66] expanded the 
traditional PINV paradigm. In this study, a modified forewarned (S1-S2) reaction paradigm 
was presented to three groups. The S1 always signaled subjects to prepare for the 
imperative stimulus (S2). In case of aversive stimulation, a short electrical shock was applied 
to the index finger of the non-dominant hand following S2. During blocks of control, correct 
button presses to the imperative stimulus avoided electrical stimulation. During 
uncontrollability, participants received electrical stimuli in randomized order in half of the 
trials irrespective of their behavioral responses (response outcome noncontingency). One 
group started with a waiting block followed by a block of uncontrollability and a final block 
of control. The authors called this group the learned helplessness group, since active 
conditions started with uncontrollability followed by controllability. The experience of 
uncontrollability was assumed to result in enhanced PINV magnitudes in the following 
condition of control. As a learned helplessness effect enhanced PINV magnitudes should 
reflect enhanced response outcome contingency processing (ambiguity) in a condition 
where aversive stimulation is objectively controllable. For validation, a second group was 
introduced, which also started with a waiting block, however, followed by two successive 
blocks of control. In contrast to the learned helplessness group, this group received constant 
control and was expected not to show PINV alterations during the final block of control. In 
addition, the study investigated a third group, which initially received a block of control, 
followed by a block of loss of control and a final block of restitution of control. This group 
was assumed to show immunization against learned helplessness, as human [67] and animal 
studies [68] found that initially experienced escapable shocks which were followed by 
inescapable shocks do diminish learned helplessness effects. Compared to the constant 
control group, the learned helplessness as well as the immunization group showed 
enhanced frontal PINV magnitudes during the second block (uncontrollability). This finding 
indicates that prior contingency learning (immunization group) does not affect the 
immediate impact of stressor uncontrollability. However, during the final block where all 
groups were able to control aversive electrical stimulation, only the learned helplessness 
group showed enhanced PINV magnitudes. These results are in line with the assumption 
that uncontrollability over aversive events alters subsequent instrumental learning when 
control is reestablished. Moreover, the experience of control prior to loss of control seems to 
protect against biased information processing during restitution of control.  
These findings expand on previous results for SCP changes in healthy individuals during 
blocks of solvable (control) followed by blocks of unsolvable (loss of control) items of a 
reasoning task [69-70]. Low resolution electromagnetic tomography (LORETA; [71]) of these 
data found activation in Brodmann area (BA) 24 in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
significantly associated with the processing of uncontrollability. Source localization analysis 
of the PINV by means of sLORETA [72] also identified BA 24 in the anterior cingulate cortex 
as a core region for PINV generation [73] (see Figure 1). A recent review [74] of 
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neuroimaging studies for this region suggest that negative affect, pain, and cognitive control 
is processed in this area, which is located in the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC). The 
aMCC is proposed to constitute a central relay or hub node which links information about 
reinforcers to motor centres responsible for expressing affect and executing aversively 
motivated instrumental behaviors. In the context of uncontrollability over aversive stimuli, a 
fMRI study also found increased activity in several brain regions (secondary somatosensory 
cortex and insula) including the ACC when a heat pain stimulus was perceived as 
uncontrollable [75]. Therefore the ACC and especially the aMCC might represent a cardinal 
region for the processing of instrumental contingencies related to (un)controllability over 
aversive events. However, a PET study [76] did not find alterations in ACC activity linked to 
the processing of solvable versus unsolvable items in a reasoning task. This study 
discovered increases in regional cerebral blood flow in the hippocampus and decreases in 
the mammillary bodies during solvable items. Subsequent unsolvable items were associated 
with decreases in hippocampal regions and increases in the mammillary bodies and the 
amygdalae. Therefore and in addition to the proposed key role of the aMCC, subcortical 
limbic areas in concert with other frontal, temporal and parietal areas seem to be engaged in 
resolving instrumental conflicts during uncontrollability over aversive stimulation [73]. 
 
Figure 1. (a) Averaged slow cortical potential (SCP) showing the post-imperative negative variation 
(PINV) in the post-S2 interval during a S1 (warning stimulus) S2 (imperative stimulus) paradigm used 
in [66, 77-79], R: reaction (button press), ES: (potential) electrical stimulation; (b) Source localization 
analysis of the PINV showed BA 24 in the anterior midcingulate cortex as key region for PINV 
generation [73] (the centre of mass location (5,5,30) from [73] is shown as a red sphere on the standard 
Colin brain). 
3.1.3. Neural correlates of uncontrollability over aversive events in depressed individuals  
Neural correlates of altered instrumental learning related to learned helplessness in 
depressed individuals have been investigated solely by means of EEG studies which 
focussed on the PINV. In comparison to healthy individuals both anhedonic individuals [80] 
and depressed patients [81] have been found to show enhanced PINV magnitudes when 
aversive stimulation was uncontrollable or when control was restricted. These findings 
suggest that depression is associated with increased vulnerability to uncontrollable aversive 
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events. By using the modified S1-S2 reaction paradigm, which includes successive 
conditions of control, loss of control, and restitution of control, it was demonstrated that 
depressed individuals show enhanced frontal PINV magnitudes during both loss of control 
and restitution of control [77]. Most remarkably and consistent with learned helplessness 
theory, the experience of uncontrollability seems to bias subsequent cortical processing in 
depressed individuals during a condition, where control over aversive stimulation is 
objectively reestablished. In addition, depressed individuals in this study showed enhanced 
ratings of helplessness in the restitution of control condition. Moreover, increased habitual 
symptom-focused and self-focused rumination were significantly linked to frontal PINV 
magnitudes during restitution of control in depressed individuals. For the first time, these 
results suggest a substantial relation between cognitive vulnerability markers of depression 
(rumination) and altered psychophysiological functioning during instrumental learning in 
depressed individuals. These results were confirmed in a follow-up study (T2) taking place 
six months after the initial assessment (T1) [79]. Alterations in PINV magnitudes were 
related to concurrent depression levels in patients, and when controlling for depression 
severity group differences in PINV magnitudes diminished. The authors concluded that 
PINV alterations wax and wane in parallel to the extent of depression severity. As frontal 
PINV magnitudes at T1 were not predictive for the amount of depressive symptoms or 
diagnostic status at T2 when baseline symptom levels were controlled, it was concluded that 
PINV alterations in depression represent a state rather than a trait marker of the disorder. 
In summary, these findings clearly indicate that depressed subjects are especially vulnerable 
to perceived uncontrollability over aversive events and that it is reasonable to speculate that 
brain regions found in healthy subjects being related to the processing of uncontrollability 
show altered functioning in depression. Evidence converge that the aMCC is substantially 
involved in the processing of stressor uncontrollability and its consequences, highlighting 
this region as relevant for both learned helplessness effects and the state of helplessness in 
depression.  
3.2. Appetitive (respondent and operant) conditioning in healthy and depressed 
individuals 
Besides enhanced susceptibility to uncontrollable negative events, depression is typically 
characterized by marked anhedonia. Behavioral models emphasize that loss over 
environmental reinforcement is linked to reduced reward-related behavior in depression 
[82]. A deficient instrumental response to appetitive contingencies has also been proposed 
by animal models of depression [83]. In humans, anhedonia seems to be linked to 
dysfunctions in mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic projections from the ventral tegmental area 
to the dorsal and ventral striatum (including the nucleus accumbens), amygdala and 
hippocampus, anterior cingulate (including the subgenual portion), and ventral prefrontal 
cortex; circuits known to be related to the processing of reward [84-85]. In addition, the 
orbitofrontal cortex is involved in reward-related decision processes [86]. While functional 
abnormalities in these regions have been identified in depressed patients [87-90], few 
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studies have examined specific deficits in reward processing in depression and underlying 
neural alterations.  
In neuropsychological tests, depressed individuals show delayed responses to positive 
stimuli in affective signal detection tasks and a reduced positive attentional bias during 
facial expression identification [91-94]. In a fMRI study with medicated depressed patients, 
anhedonia was found to be linked to increased activation in the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex and to reduced striatal activity in response to happy faces, suggesting that prefrontal 
activation might compensate for reduced striatal activation [95]. Healthy but not depressed 
individuals showed bilaterally increased activity in the fusiform gyrus and the right 
putamen to expressions of increasing happiness, while depressed individuals showed 
increased activity in the left putamen, left parahippocampal, right fusiform gyrus and 
amygdala to expressions of increasing sadness [96]. Another fMRI study used a 
dopaminergic probe to directly stimulate the human reward system [97]. Depressed 
individuals showed hypersensitive behavioral responses to the rewarding effects of d-
amphetamine in line with altered brain activity in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the 
orbitofrontal cortex, the caudate, and the putamen.  
As noted above, modern theories of associative learning emphasize the fundamental role 
of predictions (and surprise) in both Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning [39, 86]. 
The prediction error denotes the discrepancy between a received reinforcer and its 
prediction. Learning is proportional to the prediction error and reaches its asymptote 
when the prediction error approaches zero after several learning trials. In humans, a 
number of fMRI studies (cf. [98]) have investigated reward-prediction. By means of 
probabilistic tasks in which individuals learn to make a choice that gives monetary gains 
or avoids losses, it has been found that short-term reward prediction is positively 
correlated with activation in the caudate and ventral striatum and the lateral orbito-
frontal cortex, while longer-term reward prediction is positively correlated with activation 
in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the inferior parietal cortex. The ACC was found 
to be involved in monetary gambles with high versus low monetary risk. However, gain 
versus loss outcomes seem to activate medial frontal areas and the ventral striatum 
including the nucleus accumbens. A fMRI study in healthy individuals [99] found the 
nucleus accumbens proportionally activated to the magnitude of anticipated gains, 
whereas the medial prefrontal cortex showed activation changes in relation to the 
probability of anticipated gains. Similarly, activation of striatal regions has been found to 
reflect differences in magnitude and probability of reward and also medial prefrontal 
cortex activation seem to vary with the probability of reward [100]. In addition, it was 
shown that activation in the caudate and ventral striatum is positively correlated with 
behavioral indices of reward learning and that the caudate displays increased activation 
in early stages of learning. Moreover, it was shown that activation in the ventral striatum 
is positively correlated with prediction error signals during both Pavlovian and 
instrumental conditioning [101]. Furthermore, the ventral striatum was found to respond 
to a conditioned stimulus which predicts reward delivery and seems to be characterized 
by a strong outcome-related response when reward is delivered unexpectedly or a 
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decrease in activity when an expected reward is omitted. In addition, linear increases of 
activation were observed in the nucleus accumbens with increasing reward probabilities 
[102].  
Yacubian and colleagues [103] were the first to use a gambling task with different gain and 
loss magnitudes and probabilities. Only gain-related predictions and associated prediction 
errors were found to be expressed in the ventral striatum, while loss-related predictions 
and related prediction errors were localized in the amygdala. Therefore, the authors 
proposed two dissociable value systems for gains and losses and suggested that the 
ventral striatum generates value predictions to which actual outcomes were compared, 
while the amygdala predicts possible losses and compares these predictions against actual 
outcomes. 
Recent studies in depression research used variations of the monetary incentive delay 
paradigm to investigate neural similarities and disparities between the anticipation and 
receipt of reward and punishment [24, 104]. In this paradigm, trials start with the 
presentation of a cue which indicates a potential outcome (win/loss) followed by an 
imperative stimulus to which subjects have to respond with a button press. After the motor 
response subjects receive feedback about their actual outcome (win/loss). This protocol 
allows differentiating between anticipatory neural responses (in the time interval between 
the presentation of the cue and the imperative stimulus) and neural responses related to the 
presentation of the outcome (win/loss feedback). During anticipation motivational processes 
(wanting) are assumed to be linked to outcome-predicting cues, whereas during the 
outcome phase emotional responses (liking) may dominate neural responsivity, in turn 
providing reinforcers to foster learning about the relationship between cues and outcomes. 
Depressed individuals have been found to show reduced activity in fronto-striatal regions 
during both reward anticipation [105-106] and outcome [24, 104], suggesting that 
dysfunctional incentive processing in MDD is particularly linked to functional alterations in 
fronto-striatal regions. However, neuroimaging studies have also found intact responsivity 
in the ventral striatum including the nucleus accumbens [24] and enhanced anterior 
cingulate cortex activity [104] during reward anticipation. In addition, increased frontal 
activity but reduced activity in the caudate was found during the anticipation and receipt of 
reward in medication-free depressed adolescents [107]. Euthymic patients were found not to 
show fronto-striatal hypoactivity during the anticipation and receipt of reward [108]. 
Moreover, only few studies have investigated reward-related prediction error signaling in 
depression. Their results are equivocal with studies showing enhanced activity in prefrontal, 
striatal and ventral tegmental areas coding reward-associated prediction errors [109-111] but 
also reduced prediction error signaling over time in the ventral striatum and the dorsal ACC 
in depressed individuals [110]. 
Therefore and although reduced reward processing in depression seem substantially 
associated with anhedonia, the neural signature of reduced reward responsiveness in MDD 
is still a puzzling topic. Direct and indirect evidence point to fronto-striatal regions to be 
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substantially involved during both the expectation and receipt of positive outcomes. 
However, further studies are clearly needed to validate these findings. Despite differences 
in sample characteristics, future studies may additionally focus on the interaction of brain 
regions involved in altered reward processing in MDD to further elucidate the current 
heterogeneity of findings.  
4. Conclusions 
In summary, recent neuroimaging results clearly demonstrate (a) increased sensitivity of 
depressed individuals to loss of control during instrumental conditioning, subsequently (b) 
causing biased information processing of actually controllable aversive events. This 
dysfunctional learning mechanism, which is (c) linked to negative self-referential cognition 
(rumination), represents (d) a valid state marker of the disorder. Brain regions of interest for 
altered instrumental learning in MDD seem to include (e) the anterior cingulate (in 
particular the aMCC), prefrontal regions, and limbic structures (amygdala, hippocampus). 
From a respondent perspective, alterations in associative learning mechanisms were evident 
(f) already during the anticipation of positive (rewarding) outcomes, most probably 
associated (g) with reduced prefrontal, striatal, and limbic activation for positive outcomes 
and (h) altered prediction error signaling in the ventral striatum and the ACC. However and 
as mentioned above, the latter findings need further validation in future neuroimaging 
studies. 
Cognitive models of depression substantially benefit from current findings on altered 
associative learning mechanisms in MDD. Clinical interventions based on cognitive models 
such as cognitive behavioral therapy emphasize cognitive restructuring and behavioral 
activation for the treatment of depression. Increasing knowledge about the 
psychophysiological correlates of altered associative learning in MDD may result in 
focussing on interventions helping individuals suffering from MDD to experience 
controllability and hedonia. Future pre/post treatment studies should make use of 
neuroimaging methods to demonstrate treatment-specific effects of such tailored 
interventions on the neurobiological level. Moreover, recent approaches with neurofeedback 
showed the feasibility of brain self-regulation to upregulate brain areas involved in the 
generation of positive emotions in depressed patients [112]. Neurofeedback as a holistic 
approach that overcomes bio-psychological dualisms has fascinating advantages especially 
in the case of depression: By the use of operant learning mechanisms patients experience 
successful self-regulation of their own brain activity.  
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